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I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) plan to return Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation (Conrail) to the private sector by selling the
federal government's controlling interest to Norfolk Southern Corpora-
tion (Norfolk Southern) has, not surprisingly, been the subject of a
spirited debate in the transportation and political community since its
announcement in February, 1985. Detractors have voiced concerns about
loss of jobs, quality of service, rates, adequacy of the price, tax benefits,
effects on other railroads, ports, communities, and even minority ven-
dors.1 Perhaps the most virulent yet poorly understood criticism has been
that Norfolk Southern's acquisition of Conrail would adversely affect
competition. Critics have said that the sale proposal "runs directly
contrary to [antitrust] policy goals" and would have a serious, adverse
effect on competition. 2 The proposal is a "flagrant violation of antitrust
laws and would create an unconscionable monopoly."3
[T]he proposed sale of Conrail to the Norfolk Southern violates
every principle of good transportation policy and destroys the
competitive framework which is the key to the future health of
our railroad system .... [The proposal] would not survive any
rational scrutiny under antitrust concepts that have governed
every railroad merger in this country.4
The purpose of this article is to examine the legal standards histori-
cally and currently applied to considering the competitive impacts of rail
consolidations in conjunction with the goals of the legislation relating to
Conrail. With that perspective, a viewpoint will be offered as to whether
the competitive effects of the proposed sale have been addressed in a
manner consistent with those standards and goals.
II. PRESERVATION OF RAIL-RAIL COMPETITION AS
A CONSIDERATION IN RAIL CONSOLIDATIONS
A. Prior to 1920
Prior to the enactment in 1890 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, there
were no federal limitations on mergers or other consolidations of compet-
See Wall Street Journal, Aug. 8, 1985, at 22, col. 1.
2 Sale of Conrail: Hearings on S261-31.9 Before the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 323 (1985) (statement of Bruce B_ Wilson,
Vice-Pres., Law, Consolidated Rail. Corp.).
Youngstown Vindicator, Oct. 16, 1985, at 12, col. 1, (statement of Ill. Atty. Gen. Neil
F. Hartigan).
' Sale of Conrail: Hearings on S261-31.9 Before the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 219-20 (1985) (statement of Hays T. Watkins, Bd. Chairman and Chief
Exec. Officer of CSX Corp.).
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ing railroads.5 A Jay Gould or Daniel Drew, if he worried about laws at
all, could limit his concern to state corporate law and any state regulatory
law which might apply to the particular transaction involved. While the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act (Act) preceded the Sherman
Act by three years, its original provisions did not address consolidations
other than "pooling" between different carriers. 6 The Act was primarily
directed, from the shippers' point of view, to eliminating rebates, and,
from the carriers' point of view, to achieving some modicum of rate
stability in an industry then afflicted with a tremendous increase in
capacity without a corresponding increase in business.7 The railroads had
not reached the stage in their development where consolidation was
viewed as the solution of choice for their problems. Rather, the railroads
had looked primarily to rate agreements and, prior to 1887, the outright
allocation of revenues and traffic among competing carriers, the "pool,"
for relief.8
Several years after the passage of the Act, however, a major rail
consolidation movement took root. Problems such as the railroads'
inability to stabilize rates at profitable levels or to slow reckless expan-
sion of lines through provisions of the Act, rate agreements or legalized
pools, as well as problems in the economy (e.g., the Depression of 1893),
prompted calls for consolidation of the various lines.9 This movement
collided with the new national policy of enhancing economic efficiency by
protecting and promoting competition, which was promulgated in the
Sherman Act.
The first major rail unification challenged under the Sherman Act was
the attempt by the J.P. Morgan-James J. Hill-controlled Northern
Securities Company to acquire the stock of the Great Northern Railway
(GN) and Northern Pacific Railway (NP). This second attempt to amal-
gamate these competing rail lines failed when the Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court decree declaring the consolidation a "combination
in restraint of interstate and international commerce" and therefore
' Cf. G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 14 (1965).
6 Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. Pooling, much to the
chagrin of the railroads, was prohibited by the Act. Id. at § 5 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 11342).
7 G. KOLKO, supra note 5, at 7-44.
8 Id. at 17-19.
v Aldace Walker in 1890 and Collis P, Huntington in 1891 urged rail managers to
consolidate in the interest of ending anarchy. Id. at 64. Following the Depression of 1893
and the reorganization of many railroads, J.P. Morgan took the lead in acquiring control of,
although not necessarily consolidating, a large number of carriers, including the Erie,
Reading, Jersey Central, Lehigh Valley, Delaware & Hudson, Northern Pacific, Southern,
and New Haven. Id. at 65-66. These developments did not achieve the desired result as rates
declined drastically during the 1890's, from 94o per ton mile to 73v per ton mile. Id. at 66.
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prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The compeIc ive analysis by
the Court was primitive by today's standards; the Court simply found
that GN and NP were "competing and substantially parallel lines from
the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean and Puget
Sound"i" and that
[ilf such combination be not destroyed, all tk advantages that
would naturally come to the public under the op-ration of the
general laws of competition, or between the Great Northern and
Northern Pacific Railway companies, will be lost, and the entire
commerce of the immense territory in the northern part of the
United States between the Great Lakes and the Pacific at Puget
Sound will be at the mercy of a single holding corporation. . . .12
A very similar case arose out of Edward Harriman's acquisition of
control of the Union Pacific (UP) and Southern Pacific (SP) systems. The
Court determined, again without much difficulty, that UP and SP were
active competitors in that each sought, to some extent, to transport the
same commerce from the East to the Pacific Coast by their lines and
connecting lines, that the consolidation would end that competition;
therefore, the combination must be broken up. 13 The Court reached this
conclusion despite evidence that competitive traffic was a comparatively
small, although by no means negligible, part of the total traffic of UP and
SP.14
Several attempts during this period by the highly competitive anthra-
cite carriers to reduce the fierce competition between them for transpor-
" Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). An earlier attempt by GN to
purchase the bankrupt NP was forestalled by provisions of a Minnesota law prohibiting
consolidation of competing railroads. Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896).
" 193 U.S. at 326.
12 Id. at 327-28. The dissent of Justice Holmes is interesting from the standpoint of the
history of the antitrust laws. In Northern Securities the Court concluded the consolidation
was an unlawful "combination" under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 331. Justice
Holmes, in calling for strict construction of Section 1, argued that Section 1 only prohibited
combinations designed to restrain the trade of others, not the union of former competitors.
Id. at 403, 405, 406-08, 409. This position outraged President Theodore Roosevelt (i.e., "t
could carve out of a banana a judge with more backbone than that"), C.D. BOWEN, YANKEE
FROM OLYMPUS 370 (1944), and the doubts thus created about § 1 contributed to the passage
of § 7 of the Clayton Act in 1914. L.B. SCHWARTZ & J.J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY
ALTERNATIVES (FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION) 154 (5th ed. 1977).
"" United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912). At the time UP unlike SP did
not reach California, reaching the Pacific only in Oregon. UP ownership of a steamship line
operating between Portland and San Francisco and UP traffic interchanged with the
S.P.-controlled Central Pacific in Utah for movement into California were, however, cited as
evidence of UP competition with SP for California (and not merely Oregon) transcontinen-
tal business. Id. at 89-90.
14 Id. at 88-89.
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tation of coal from the Pennsylvania fields to New York Harbor involved
court action. At least two of them involved consolidations. In United
States v. Reading Co., 15 the Court ordered the Reading Company, owner
of Reading Railroad, an anthracite carrier, to divest itself of control of the
Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, a parallel line for anthracite
movements to New York. Similarly, in United States v. Lehigh Valley
Railroad,'6 the Lehigh's control of the Delaware, Susquehanna &
Schuylhill Railroad, a collection carrier in the anthracite fields, was
found to be both illegal monopolization and a combination in restraint of
trade.
The Supreme Court's 1922 decision in United States v. Southern Pacific
Co. 17 postdated the Transportation Act of 1920 but nevertheless properly
belongs with the pre-1920 cases. In 1885 Southern Pacific leased the
Central Pacific Railway (CP), the western portion of the original trans-
continental railroad running from San Francisco Bay to Ogden, Utah,
and in 1899 acquired stock control of CP. Perhaps spurred by its success
in the Union Pacific"' case, the United States initiated an action in 1914
calling for SP to divest itself of its interests in CP. The Court's decision
was a replay of its Union Pacific decision. The Court found that SP and
CP were in competition for carrying freight between the East and
Midwest and the Pacific Coast [(i.e., the CP over the central corridor in
conjunction with connecting lines to the east, SP over its southern
route)]; 19 therefore, this combination was in restraint of trade and SP was
required to divest its interests in CP.2°
Thus, as of 1920, a rail consolidation could be enjoined merely by
showing that there was some significant competition between the two
carriers. So long as this was the law, attempted consolidation of two
railroads with more than a negligible amount of parallel operations was
foreclosed.
'5 253 U.S. 26 (1920). The New Jersey courts had earlier forced termination of the lease
by Reading of the Central and the Lehigh Valley because such violated state antitrust laws.
Stockton, Att'y Gen'l v. Central R.R., 50 N.J. Eq. 52, 24 A. 964 (1892).
e 254 U.S. 255 (1920). Lehigh was permitted to retain control of the Delaware,
Susquehanna & Schuylhill by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1924, apparently on
the ground that the public interest would not be served by disentangling an already
almagamated railroad. Control of Delaware, Susquehanna & Schuylhill R.R. by Lehigh
Valley R.R, 86 I.C.C. 567, 569 (1924).
17 259 U.S. 214 (1922).
18 See supra note 13.
'9 For example, the CP over the central corridor in conjunction with connecting lines to
the east, SP over its southern route.
20 259 U.S. at 229-30.
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B. 1920 - 1940
The Interstate Commerce Act was amended substantially by the
Transportation Act of 1920. This legislation marked the return of the
railroads to the private sector after two years of federal control prompted
by World War I. The new act resulted largely from the belief that the
railroads required comprehensive federal regulation to attain rational-
ization and stability. 21 This concern was reflected in the provisions
permitting pooling2 2 and requiring a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for construction lines, 23 and the directive to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (Commission) to prepare a plan to consolidate the
railroads into a limited number of systems.24
There had been strong support in Congress (from the Senate especially
and Senator Cummins particularly) for a bill authorizing the Commis-
sion to order compulsory consolidations.25 However, this feature of the
bill did not pass, either in 1920 or in subsequent years, largely because of
railroad opposition.26 Section 407 of the Transportation Act did permit
the Commission to authorize the acquisition of control of one carrier by
another when the acquisition was in the public interest. Furthermore,
section 407 authorized the consolidation of two or more carriers when the
consolidation was in the public interest, in harmony with and in
furtherance of the Commission's plan of consolidation and when the
consolidation complied with certain other restrictions. Most significantly,
the section added Section 5(8) to the Act:
The carriers affected by any order made under the foregoing
provisions of this section and any corporation organized to effect
a consolidation approved and authorized in such order shall be,
and they are hereby, relieved from the operation of the antitrust
laws . . . and of all other restraints or prohibitions by law, state or
federal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to do
anything authorized or required by any order made under and
pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section.2 7
The above provisions reflected Congress' belief that the rail system was
sufficiently valuable to the nation and unique in character to justify a
21 G. KOLKO, supra note 5, at 229.
22 Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 456,480 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 11342).
" Id. at § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10901).
24 Section 407, 41 Stat. 456, 480 (repealed 1940).
25 See R. MACVEAGH, THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 1920 278-82 (1923); St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 316 (1954).
26 347 U.S. at 315-21.
17 Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 456, 480(codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 11341(a)).
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national policy encouraging its preservation by consolidation into com-
paratively few systems. Advocates of the new bill reasoned that the
operating costs of the carriers remaining after consolidation would be
more comparable and, therefore, rail bankruptcies resulting from mar-
ginal carriers attempting to meet price competition with efficient carriers
would be less common.28 Also, Commission regulation could, with fewer,
more rationally drawn systems, better preserve the balance between
assuring reasonable rates to shippers and an adequate return to carri-
ers.
29
Congress no doubt also recognized that many of the existing carriers in
this balkanized industry were not viable as then structured and that the
large capital costs involved in constructing new lines of railroad and the
geographically fixed nature of existing lines prevented ready redeploy-
ment of capital. 30 These circumstances supported the adoption of a rail
consolidation policy more flexible than that permitted under the anti-
trust laws for industries not so infected with a public interest and without
such barriers to entry or exit. While Congress has modified the Interstate
Commerce Act from time to time since 1920, and the transportation
environment has changed dramatically, Congress has not significantly
altered the national policy promoting rail consolidations reflected in the
1920 Act.
The contrast between the consolidation policy under the new law and
the antitrust laws was dramatically illustrated in 1923 when the South-
ern Pacific obtained Commission approval for its control of the Central
Pacific, only one year after the Supreme Court had ordered divestiture.
31
The Commission stated:
We entertain no doubt that such arrangement [divestiture] would
be practicable, and we are of the opinion that if the two companies
entered fairly into the spirit of the Supreme Court's mandate,
many of the disadvantages to which we have alluded as arising
out of separation would be eliminated or mitigated. On the whole,
however, we are convinced that even if everything of this nature
which can be done were done, the result would be more expensive
and less efficient and satisfactory service than can be rendered
under unified control. The two systems would be weakened both
financially and from the standpoint of service.
32
What took more time to sort out was the proper accommodation
28 S. REP. No. 304, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
29 id.
30 Id.
31 Central Pac. Ry. Control, 76 I.C.C. 508, affd sub nom. United States v. Southern Pac.
Co., 290 F. 443 (D. Utah 1923).
32 Id. at 520.
1986]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1986
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
between the Act's public interest standard for consolidation and the
policies of the antitrust laws. The Central Pacific33 case notwithstanding,
the Commission in the 1920's and early 1930's considered preservation of
rail-rail competition a significant, even dispositive, factor in treating the
relatively few major consolidation proposals which arose while the
Commission struggled first to sell, and then scrap, its consolidation
plan.3 4 For example, in 1926 the Commission disapproved the proposed
lease of the Virginian Railway by Norfolk and Western Railway solely on
the ground that competition between the two lines would be eliminated. 35
In 1930 the Commission employed its powers under the Clayton Act 36
(the Commission did not at this time possess power under the Interstate
Commerce Act to order an existing combination broken up37) to order the
Baltimore & Ohio to divest itself of its ownership of 42.8% of the stock of
the competing Western Maryland Railway. 38 (Interestingly, the Commis-
sion permitted both of these consolidations thirty years later.3
9)
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide some guidance on
the accommodation between the Act and the antitrust laws in 1932 when
the Court reviewed the Commission's approval of New York Central's
acquisition of control of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis
Railway and the Michigan Central Railroad.40 The Court opted for
" See supra note 31.
34 For a time the Commission was wont to disapprove consolidations for failure to
complement its plan of consolidation. See, e.g., Proposed Control of Erie R.R. and Pere
Marquette Ry. by Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 138 I.C.C. 517 (1928); Control of Buffalo, Rochester
& Pittsburgh Ry. by Delaware & Hudson Co., 131 I.C.C. 750 (1927). No doubt this had a
chilling effect on rail consolidations.
31 Proposed Acquisition of Control of Virginian Ry. by Norfolk & W. Ry., 117 I.C.C. 67
(1926).
36 Section 11 of the Clayton Act authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to
enforce compliance with Section 7 of that act where applicable to common carriers subject
to the Interstate Commerce Act. 15 U.S.C. § 21 That power has apparently not been used
since the Interstate Commerce Act was amended in 1933, see supra note 37, to prohibit
consolidation of two or more carriers other than in accordance with the Interstate
Commerce Act. See Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Merger-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 320 I.C.C.
122, 132 (1963), vacated sub noma. Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 14
(N.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded, 382 U.S. 154 (1965). That rail consolidations were not
to be governed by the Clayton Act but rather by the Interstate Commerce Act was further
driven home by the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act exempting Commission approved
transactions from coverage. See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
" Section 202 of the Act of June 16, 1933 added a provision making unlawful the
continuance of control or management of two or more carriers other than in accordance with
the Act. Act June 16, 1933, ch. 91, Title 11, § 702, 48 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 11343(b)).
38 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 160 I.C.C. 785 (1930).
a See Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Western Md. Ry-, 328 I.C.C. 684 (1967); Norfolk
& W. Ry.-Merger-Virginian Ry., 307 I.C.C. 401 (1959).
'o New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
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leaving the Commission considerable leeway without offering meaning-
ful guidance:
The fact that carriers' lines are parallel and competing cannot be
deemed to affect the validity of the authority conferred upon the
Commission.... The question whether the acquisition of control
in case of competing carriers will aid in preventing an injurious
waste and in serving more efficient transportation service is thus
committed to the judgment of the administrative agency .... 41
By the time the Supreme Court considered the accommodation issue in
depth again it was some years later and concerned not railroads but their
up-and-coming nemesis, the trucking industry.
C. 1940 - 1980
With the enactment of the Transportation Act of 1940 came belated
congressional recognition that the dream of a Commission inspired
consolidation program would not come to fruition. Instead, Congress
reemphasized the goal of rationalizing the rail system while freeing the
carriers from the requirement that rail consolidations be consistent with
the Commission's consolidation plan. 42 "[T]he power to initiate mergers
and consolidations was left completely in the hands of the carriers.."4 3 The
1940 Act also specified the four considerations which must, among others,
be given weight in determining whether a rail consolidation, merger or
acquisition is in the public interest.44 Preservation of competition was not
then specifically listed.45 Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court finally
addressed in some detail the proper accommodation between the Act and
the antitrust laws in a consolidation proceeding before the Commission.
Although the decision, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,46 involved
the consolidation of motor carriers, the statutes interpreted applied
equally to rail carriers.
The Commission had authorized the consolidation of seven large motor
carriers into a new company, Associated Transport, Inc. The new com-
pany would be the only single ownership truckline operating from New
England to Florida and would become the largest motor carrier in the
United States. McLean Trucking Company, a competing carrier, sued to
set aside Commission approval of the transaction. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) entered the case in support of McLean. 47
41 Id. at 25-26.
42 See Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, Title 1, § 7, 54 Stat. 898, 905 (1940).
43 St. Joe Paper, 347 U.S. at 319.
44 See 54 Stat. 898, 905 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 11344(b)).
45 Id.
46 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
41 Id. at 68-72.
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In reaching its decision, the Court stated "there can be little doubt that
the Commission is not to measure proposals for all-rail or all-motor
consolidations by the standards of the anti-trust laws."48 Neither, how-
ever, has Congress "authorized the Commission in passing on a merger to
ignore their policy."49 The Court cited provisions of the national trans-
portation policy "promoting economical service and fostering sound
economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers"
and "encourag[ing] the establishment and maintenance of reasonable
charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations" as
the statutory source for consideration of competition. 50
In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise
the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result
from the proposed consolidation and consider them along with the
advantages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc.,
to determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating
the overall transportation policy.51
In this case, the Court went on to decide that the Commission had not
exceeded its discretion in finding that the proposed consolidation would
result in improved transportation service, greater efficiency of operation
and substantial operating economies. It further stated that ample
competition would remain and concluded that the transaction was in the
public interest.5 2
World War II, post-war prosperity and the economies obtained in the
changeover from steam to diesel motive power delayed for a time a large
scale rail consolidation movement. By the end of the 1950's, however,
construction of a national highway system and the corresponding devel-
opment of a highly competitive motor carrier industry, as well as the
growth of inland water carriers and pipelines, forced the railroads to
consider again the advantages of consolidation. 53
The McLean54 decision was applied to a rail merger in Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. v. United States.55 This case concerned Commission ap-
48 Id. at 84-85.
49 Id. at 86.
50 Id. at 86-87.
51 Id. at 87.
52 Id. at 88-90.
" Revenue carloadings of major railroads had dropped from 52,817,915 in 1929 to
37,636,031 in 1955, and dropped further to 27,160,247 in 1970. RAILROAD FACTS 24 (1984).
The railroads' market share, by revenue freight ton-miles, dropped from 74.9% in 1929, to
56.2% in 1950 and 39.8% in 1970, while the motor carriers' share over the same years rose
from 3.3% to 16.3% and then 21.3%. Id. at 32. The market share of water carriers on rivers
and canals, and of pipelines, rose markedly in those years also. Id.
5' See supra note 46.
55 361 U.S. 173 (1959).
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proval of ajoint application by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
and the Pennsylvania Railroad to acquire control of the Toledo, Peoria &
Western Railroad (TP&W), a bridge carrier operating principally be-
tween a connection with the Santa Fe at Lomax, Illinois and the
Pennsylvania at Effner, Indiana. The Commission had found that both
Santa Fe and Pennsylvania were, to some extent, competitors of the
TP&W since interchanging with TP&W at Lomax or Effner resulted in
short hauling themselves (i.e. both Santa Fe and Pennsylvania had lines
parallel to TP&W lines and normally carriers prefer, for revenue reasons,
to get their longest possible haul rather than interchange to another
carrier short of the long haul interchange). Nonetheless the Commission
had approved the control application and the Court affirmed, relying on
McLean.56
There followed a long line of rail consolidations which were, in almost
all instances, approved as consistent with the public interest. Some of
these involved lines which competed extensively with each other. One of
the most fiercely contested was the merger of the Seaboard Air Line and
Atlantic Coast Line Railroads.5 7 The Seaboard Air Line and Atlantic
Coast Line were major competitors of each other in a six state area and
together owned 81% of the rail mileage in the state of Florida. 58 Of their
combined tonnage, 33.4% was found to be competitive as between the two
lines, 59 and both carriers were profitable with every prospect of remain-
ing so for the immediate future.60 Nonetheless, the Commission approved
the merger and, after reversal of the Commission's decision by a federal
district court on competition grounds, the Supreme Court, in remanding
the matter to the district court, strongly indicated its concurrence with
the Commission's decision. The Court concluded that the district court
had failed to properly apply McLean and Minneapolis & St. Louis
Railway:
[The Commission] recognized that the merger would eliminate
competition and create a rail monopoly in parts of Florida. But it
found that the merged lines carried only a small part of the total
traffic in the area involved; that ample rail competition would
remain therein; and that the reduction in competition would
'have no appreciably injurious effect upon shippers and
5 Id- at 238-39
5 The U.S. Department of Justice, the Georgia Public Service Commission, various
railroads, and a good number of shippers and communities in the Southeast were opposed
to the merger Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Merger-At. Coast Line R.R., 320 I.C.C. 122, 124,
161-62 (1963), vacated sub. nom, Fla. East Coast Ry. v. United States, 242 F. Supp 14 (N.D.
Fla.), vacated and remanded, 382 U.S. 154 (1965).
58 320 I.C.C. at 163.
59 Id. at 164.
ro Id. at 146-53.
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communities'.... In addition, the Commission noted that the
need to preserve intramodal rail competition had diminished due
to the fact that railroads were increasingly losing traffic to truck,
water and other modes of competition. 61
The merger was ultimately consummated by creation of the Seaboard
Coast Line Railroad, which today as Seaboard System Railroad is an
important constituent of the CSX system.
The Commission similarly approved the consolidation of such compet-
itive carriers as the Louisville & Nashville and Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis,62 the Virginian and Norfolk and Western,63 the Erie and the
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western,64 the Baltimore & Ohio and
Chesapeake & Ohio65 (and later the Western Maryland),6 6 the Illinois
Central Gulf and the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio,67 and the Pennsylvania and
New York Central.68 It was only in the case of a consolidation where the
efficiencies to be realized were relatively small and the loss of intramodal
competition deemed relatively significant that the Commission disap-
proved an application on grounds of loss of competition. This was the case
in the proposed acquisition of the Western Pacific by the Southern
Pacific.69 These carriers had parallel lines in the central corridor between
Utah and Northern California, an area of the country in which the
Commission found intramodal competition of greater significance than
other areas of the country because of the distances involved.70 Both
6 382 U.S. at 154.
62 Louisville & N. R.R. Merger, 295 I.C.C. 457 (1957), aff'dsub nom. Louisville & N. R.R.
v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Ky. 1965). The City of Nashville objected,
unsuccessfully, on the ground that the merger would reduce the number of competing trunk
line carriers in Nashville from two to one (or three to two, if the Tennessee Central,
connecting elsewhere with the Illinois Central and Southern, was considered).
6 Norfolk & W. Ry.-Merger-Virginian Ry., 307 I.C.C. 401 (1959).
64 Erie R.R.-Merger-Delaware, Lackawanna & W. RR., 312 I.C.C. 185, appeal
dismissed sub nom. Brotherhood of Maint, of Way Empl. v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 942
(E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 174 (1961).
65 Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Baltimore & 0. R.R., 317 I.C.C 216 (1962).
Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Western Md. Ry., 328 I.C.C. 684 (1967), appeal
dismissed sub. noma. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa.
1968).
67 Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R.-Acquisition-Gulf, Mobile & 0. R.R., 338 I.C.C. 805 (1971),
appeal dismissed sub noam. Missouri P. R.R. v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.Mo.
1972), affd, 409 U.S. 1094 (1973). The Department of Justice opposed the Gulf, Mobile &
Ohio acquisition because it believed a substantial loss of competition would result from
consolidation of the parallel Central and Gulf systems.
6 Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 475 (1966), aff d sub
nom. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), affd, 389
U.S. 486 (1968).
69 Southern Pac. Co.-Control-Western Pac. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 387 (1965).
70 Id- at 400.
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carriers were profitable and the efficiencies and other benefits of the
acquisition were largely limited to some operational consolidations.
If there remained any doubt that preservation of intramodal competi-
tion was only one factor to be considered in approving or disapproving a
rail consolidation, that doubt was eliminated in United States v. Interstate
Commerce Commission (Northern Lines Merger Cases).71 The consolida-
tion between Great Northern and Northern Pacific struck down by the
Supreme Court in 1904 was approved by the Court in 1971. The Court
affirmed Commission approval of the merger citing projected public
benefits of $40 million per year. These benefits resulted largely from
more efficient routing of traffic, elimination of redundant facilities and a
reduced need for new employees on the consolidated system, such
improvements as improved car supply and tracing, wider routing and
better claims service, and the presence of the strengthened Milwaukee
Road as a northern tier competitor (the extension of Milwaukee to the
Pacific Coast had occurred since 1904). 72
D. 1980 - Present
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 represented a major overhaul of the
Interstate Commerce Act designed to promote the rehabilitation and
financial viability of the railroads by reforming federal regulatory policy
to better balance the needs of carriers, shippers and the public. Congress
specifically recognized that railroads historically were the essential
factors in the national transportation system but that today most
transportation in the United States is competitive, that nearly two-thirds
of the nation's intercity freight was transported by modes other than rail,
and that the earnings of the rail carriers were insufficient to generate
funds for necessary capital improvements. 73 The Act substantially liber-
alized regulation of rail rates in the interest of alleviating this capital
shortfall and the general decline of the rail industry.74
Perhaps because the public interest standard for approval of rail
consolidations was thought to be sufficiently flexible already, the Stag-
gers Act did not overhaul the existing scheme for permitting rail
consolidations. Congress did, however, indicate its approval of consolida-
tion as a means of promoting the health of the rail industry by limiting
the Commission's discretion to disapprove a rail consolidation not involv-
71 396 U.S. 491 (1970).
72 Id. at 505-16. Court approval came over the vigorous opposition of the Department of
Justice.
71 Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-448, §§ 2, 3, 94 Stat. 1897 (1980).
74 See, e.g., § 201(a) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10701a) of the Act which provides a rail rate
need be reasonable only if a rail carrier has market dominance over the transportation to
which a particular rate applies. Formerly, all rail rates had to be "reasonable" as
determined by the Commission. See 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (repealed).
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ing the merger or control of at least two Class I railroads.7 5 The Act also
added to the four factors the Commission must consider in determining
whether to approve the merger or control of at least two Class I railroads
"whether the proposed transaction would have an adverse effect on
competition among rail carriers in the affected region."76 This factor was
not deemed a substantive addition to the Act, however, but merely a
codification of the existing McLean rule.7 7
The combining of regional railroads into larger systems accelerated in
the 1980's. Recent consolidations have involved the creation of large
systems better able to compete with motor carriers by offering single line
service over great distances.78 Most have been end-to-end consolidations
but even these have had some competitive impact.
CSX Corporation - Control - Chessie System, Inc. and Seaboard Coast
Line Industries, Inc.79 involved the consolidation of a predominately
midwestern and northeastern carrier (Chessie) with a predominately
southeastern carrier (Seaboard). Chessie and Seaboard did, however,
have some significant overlapping operations; both carriers operated
lines between Chicago and the Ohio River for movements beyond, to and
from the Southeast. "The competition between Family Lines [Seaboard]
and Chessie in this market may be described as parallel."80 Nonetheless,
the Commission concluded that the elimination of one rail competitor in
a market in which several other carriers would remain was outweighed
by the procompetitive effects of the single-system service created by the
transaction.8 ' Single-system service would permit CSX to develop new
traffic currently moved by other modes of transportation.
Both carriers were also originators of significant amounts of coal used
by utilities in the Southeast and there was concern about elimination of
this source of competition.8 2 The Commission acknowledged there might
be some diminishment of source competition, however, it found this com-
15 Pub.L. No. 96-448, § 228(b), 94 Stat. 1931. A Class I railroad as of 1984 was one with
annual operating revenues of $87.3 million or more. RAILROAD FACTS 2 (1984).
76 Pub.L. No. 96-448, § 228(a), 94 Stat. 1931.
17 See Norfolk S. Corp.-Control-Norfolk and W. Ry. and S. Ry., 366 I.C.C. 171 (1982).
78 In addition to those cases cited in footnotes 75 and 81, see Guilford Transp. Indus.,
Inc.-Control-Delaware & Hudson Ry., 366 I.C.C. 396, aff d in part and remanded in part
sub nom. Central Vermont Ry, v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 711 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc.-Control-Boston & Maine R.R., 366 I.C.C. 294 (1982),
affid in relevant part sub nom. Lamoille Valley R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 711
F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Norfolk S. Corp.-Control-Norfolk & W. Ry. and S. Ry., 366
I.C.C. 171 (1982); Burlington N.-Control and Merger St. Louis San Francisco Ry., 360
I.C.C. 788 (1980).
'9 363 I.C.C. 518 (1980), affd sub nom. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 698 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983).
0 363 I.C.C. at 565.
"' Id. at 566, 574.
s2 Id. at 567-70.
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petition insignificant in light of the fact that most utilities were served by
only one railroad and the few that were served by two railroads would have
continued access to alternate sources of coal.83 The Commission clearly
believed that consolidations permitting rail carriers to compete more
effectively with other modes of transportation were in the public interest,
even if some reduction in rail-rail competition would occur.
8 4
In Union Pacific Corp.-Control-Missouri Pacific Corp.,85 the Commis-
sion concluded that a substantial reduction in rail-rail competition would
occur in two instances. The elimination of Missouri Pacific (MP) as an
independent competitor of UP in the central transcontinental corridor
east of Denver was deemed significant and, accordingly, the transaction
was conditioned upon UP granting trackage rights to Denver & Rio
Grande Western and Southern Pacific to replace MP as a competitor in
this corridor.8 6 The elimination of MP as an independent competitor of
UP between Kansas City and Omaha/Council Bluffs was similarly
deemed significant and, accordingly, the transaction was also conditioned
upon UP granting trackage rights to the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rail-
road (M-K-T) between Kansas City and Omaha/Council Bluffs.87 The
Commission was also concerned about possible vertical foreclosure be-
tween Kansas City and the Gulf grain export ports resulting from the
combination of UP and MP. UP originated considerable grain in Ne-
braska and Kansas and MP and M-K-T were two of the rail carriers
operating between Kansas City and the Gulf ports. Since M-K-T de-
pended heavily on UP for interchange of traffic at Kansas City and would
likely lose much of this traffic to MP upon consolidation, the transaction
was conditioned upon UP/MP granting M-K-T trackage rights to several
grain originating points in Nebraska and Kansas in order to preserve
M-K-T as an effective competitor south of Kansas City.88 It is notable that
the Commission protected intramodal competition only in geographical
areas (i.e., longhaul transcontinental corridor) or with commodities (i.e.,
grain) where intramodal competition was not thought to be effective.
The Commission has adopted a policy statement applicable to the
merger or control of two Class I railroads.8 9 The Commission notes there
are two potential results from consolidation which "would ill serve the
public-reduction of competition and harm to essential services."9o The
Commission states therein:
83 Id. at 571-73.
84 See id. at 574.
85 366 I.C.C. 459 (1982), affd sub nom. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 736 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1172 (1985).
sc 736 F.2d at 726.
8' Id. at 720.
88 Id.
" 49 C.F.R. § 1180.1 (1985).
90 49 C.F.R. § 1180.1(c) (2).
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The Commission recognizes that rail carriers face not only
intramodal competition, but also intermodal competition from
motor and water carriers. The Commission's competitive analysis
depends on the relevant markets. In some markets the Commis-
sion's focus will be on the preservation of effective intermodal
competition, while in other markets (such as long-haul move-
ments of bulk commodities) effective intramodal competition may
also be important.9 1
The emphasis on intermodal competition indicates how far the competi-
tive analysis of rail consolidations has come since the Northern Securi-
ties92 case.
The bankruptcy of Penn Central and certain other railroads, the
formation of Conrail and the subsequent determination to sell Conrail
has a statutory history of its own. Preservation of rail-rail competition is
only one of many goals, but by no means the overriding goal, Congress
has pursued in railroad legislation.
III. PRESERVATION OF RAIL-RAIL COMPETITION AS A CONSIDERATION IN THE
FORMATION OF CONRAIL AND SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATION TO SELL CONRAIL
A. 1970's Congressional Response to the Penn Central and Other
Railroad Bankruptcies
On June 21, 1979, the Penn Central Transportation Company filed a
petition for voluntary reorganization under the bankruptcy laws in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.93
The Penn Central collapse was the largest bankruptcy in American
history up to that time.9 4 It was accompanied by the failure of most of the
other railroads serving the Northeastern United States: the Reading,
Central of New Jersey, Lehigh Valley, Erie Lackawanna, and smaller
lines. 95
At the time the principal tool for accomplishing a railroad reorganiza-
tion was Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.96 Enacted during the 1930's,
Section 77 was designed primarily to facilitate the restructuring of
capital, which was perceived as the predominant cause of rail failures at
that time, and less so, with the restructuring of rail systems and
facilities. Recognizing that Section 77 was entirely inadequate for the
structural problems of railroads in the Northeast, Congress enacted the
91 49 C.F.R. § 1180.1(c)(2)(i).
92 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
j. R. DAUGHAN AND P. BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL 306-07 (1971).
14 Id. at Inside Front Cover.
9 E. F. P. STRIPLIN, THE NORFOLK AND WESTERN: A HISTORY 356-57 (1981).
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1951) (repealed).
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Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (3-R Act) to provide a more
permanent answer to the Northeastern railroad bankruptcies.97 The
declaration of Congressional policy firmly established that the focus
remained upon "essential rail service"98 and "identification of a rail
service system in the midwest and northeast which is adequate to meet
the needs and service requirements of this region and of the national rail
transportation system."99 Preservation and enhancement of rail-rail
competition were not among the stated Congressional findings and
purposes of the 3-R Act. 10 0
Among other things, the 3-R Act provided for the creation of Conrail
pursuant to a Final System Plan formulated by the United States
Railway Association (USRA).101 Consistent with the overall purposes of
the 3-R Act, the principal goal of the Final System Plan was "a
financially self-sustaining ... rail service system adequate to meet the
rail transportation needs and service requirements of the [Northeast]."]o2
Competition was farther down the list of eight Final System Plan
goals.103
Congress' priorities were not accidental or ill-considered. Rather, they
sprang from a crisis-generated grasp of competitive realities in the
Northeast. The Senate Commerce Committee's lengthy study of Penn
Central had recognized the increasing importance of truck and other
intermodal competition.10 4 To provide a better understanding of the place
of rail service, Congress in the 3-R Act required the Secretary of
Transportation to issue a report recommending the geographic zones in
which and between which continued rail service should be provided.105
The required report was issued on February 1, 1974, as Rail Service in the
Midwest and Northeast Region (Rail Service), which in turn provided a
starting point for the USRA's Preliminary System Plan (PSP) of February
26, 1975.
B. Foundation of Initial Congressional Policy
Rail Service and PSP give a clear statement of the rationale for both
Conrail's structure and the subsequent legislation.
The current rail system was built in economic times and under
economic conditions very different from those prevailing in the 1970's.
17 See 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-748 (1974).
98 45 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2) (1974).
qq 45 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1974).
1oo See 45 U.S.C. § 701 (1974).
101 See 45 U.S.C. § 716 (1974).
102 45 U.S.C. § 716(a)(1), (2) (1974).
103 See 45 U.S.C. § 716(a)(5) (1974).
104 SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, THE PENN CENTRAL AND OTHER RAILROADS, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 304-06 (1972).
105 See 45 U.S.C. § 714.
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The system was constructed to meet local transportation and political
needs, at a time when other modes offered few alternatives and little
competition and with little thought given to national or even regional
needs.106 Even as competition from other modes developed and prospered
and track miles gradually shrank, system tonnage capacity grew as
freight cars became larger, locomotives became more powerful, yards
were automated and improved traffic control systems were installed.o7
While the physical capacity of the freight system was increasing, the
rail share of total freight traffic and the need for the increased capacity
was declining. As a result, railroads included many duplicate main lines
with very low average density as compared with capacity,'0 8 thousands of
miles of local service lines generating insufficient traffic and revenue to
return the cost of operation, 0 9 and more than one railroad serving
markets which generated sufficient rail traffic to support only one
railroad."l0
In the railroad industry excess capacity often caused excess competi-
tion among competitors unwilling or unable to leave the market. Too
much competition in the rail industry was one of the causes of infrequent
service, poor plant and equipment utilization, high unit costs, and high
rail rates; a combination of these factors exacerbated the financial
instability of the industry.'
In order to assure the public of competitive rates and services, DOT
recommended that only within and between high volume, long haul
markets was rail-rail competition to be considered.112 Total rail traffic
volume, not market share or other factors, was to be the principal
determinant in preserving rail-rail competition. Direct rail-rail competi-
tion would be preserved only where traffic volumes and flows would
permit two railroads to provide service with acceptable operating effi-
ciency. 113
DOT suggested certain characteristics for markets within which or
between which rail-rail competition should be preserved: (1) traffic
must have a length-of-haul of at least 200 miles; (2) traffic volume must
be sufficient to be handled in efficiently sized trains (i.e., 30 loaded cars
for merchandise trains and 75 loaded cars for bulk commodities); (3) cars
in the efficiently sized trains must all be moving in the same general
direction to minimize out of route movement and intermediate switching;
106 PSP at 2.
107 Rail Service at 5-6.
108 Id. at 8.
109 Id. at 10.
110 Id. at 12.
11' PSP at 108.
11' Rail Service at 14, 23.
" Id. at 30.
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and (4) traffic volume and directional flow must support frequent train
service (i.e., eight trainloads daily inbound or outbound in the same
general direction). 14 Applying the numerical criteria it had developed,
Rail Service identified only 17 zones, plus certain major gateways, at
which and between which rail-rail competition should be maintained. 1" 5
DOT concluded that "required improvements in rail operating effi-
ciency cannot be achieved without making some significant reductions in
interrailroad competition.",1" 6 Recognizing that intermodal competition
was a significant market force and an adequate alternative to rail-rail
competition, DOT recommended that in low-volume, short-haul markets
only intermodal competition be promoted.117
Defining "workable competition" for purposes of the PSP, USRA also
focused upon the size of the market in terms of rail traffic volume.118
USRA accepted the goal of preserving interrailroad competition in major
markets, but recognizing the conflict with other goals, 1" 9 recommended
service by only two railroads in major eastern seaboard markets.120
USRA was concerned about eliminating the high costs of excessive
interrailroad competition and achieving the benefits of economies of
density. 12'
USRA looked carefully at the growth and effectiveness of intermodal
competition; even before restructuring direct rail-rail competition at the
customer site had become rare.122 The conclusions USRA reached in the
PSP were that intermodal competition was an adequate substitute to
meet the public needs in many markets, that indirect rail competition
could produce many of the same benefits as direct rail-rail competition
and that increasingly efficient intermodal competition would continue to
reduce the benefits derived solely from interrailroad competition. 123 On
this basis, USRA decided that, if necessary, indirect rail and intermodal
competition could meet the competitive goals of the 3-R Act.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 31-35.
116 Id. at 12.
117 Id. at 14.
1'8 PSP at 109.
119 Id. at 12.
120 Id. at 39.
121 Id. at 107-09. Norfolk Southern's purchase of Conrail will achieve USRA's goal of
preserving competition in major markets (e.g., Cleveland, Toledo, Canton-Massillon, Ohio,
etc.) while achieving economies of density (e.g., consolidating Norfolk Southern, Conrail
Ohio-St.Louis traffic on Conrail's Muncie, In - St. Louis line). See generally STUDY OF THE
ESTIMATED TRAFFIC DIVERSION AND VIABILITY OF THE DIVESTITURE PROPOSALS RESULTING FROM THE
ACQUISITION OF THE CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION By NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION
(Verified Statement of Louis M. Newton) (filed with Interstate Commerce Comm'n, May 24,
1985).
122 PSP at 111.
123 Id. at 121-22.
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C. Implementing the Policy
The Final System Plan implemented these conclusions. Congress
approved the Final System Plan through express enactment. 124 Accord-
ingly, Conrail's creation reflected a carefully articulated policy favoring
an efficient railroad as a better competitive instrument than multiple,
traffic-starved railroads.
The 3-R Act restructuring was consummated on April 1, 1976, when
thousands of miles of line were actually deeded to Conrail. USRA
proposed making major transfers to Chessie, but the breakdown of labor
negotiations frustrated this undertaking. 125 Similarly, a USRA proposal
to transfer a line into the Wilmington, Delaware, area to Southern
Railway failed because of labor problems.126 Norfolk and Western Rail-
way did acquire an approximately 100-mile route making its access from
Cincinnati to Chicago and St. Louis less circuitous' 27 and Delaware and
Hudson Railway acquired trackage rights to Buffalo, Washington, north-
ern New Jersey, and Philadelphia. 128 On the whole, however, participa-
tion of solvent, privately owned carriers in the restructuring was limited.
Aside from labor issues and the emphasis upon creating an efficient
railroad, the problems facing Conrail were simply too overwhelming for
such participation to be attractive to other railroads.
Several subsequent reports on the future of Conrail emphasized greater
concern for retaining adequate rail service than assuring continued
rail-rail competition.i 29 Conrail confirmed that trucks, not other rail-
roads, were and would continue to be its major source of competition. 130
As the rail market share continued to fall, it had become apparent that
some major rail markets served by Conrail no longer had the traffic mix
124 See 45 U.S.C. § 718(d) (1).
125 See United States Railway Ass'n, Final System Plan 18, 28-29 (1975); Norfolk & W.
Ry. and New York, C. & St. Louis R.R.-Merger, 363 I.C.C. 270, 279 (1980).
126 See FINAL SYSTEM PLAN at 26-28.
117 See id. at 19.
128 363 I.C.C. at 279. Delaware & Hudson's rights were a last minute response to Chessie
System's decision not to purchase major parts of the Erie Lackawanna and Reading
systems. Id.
129 These reports, issued in response to a Staggers Act directive, were: UNITED STATES
RAILWAY ASS'N, FEDERAL FUNDING OF CONRAIL: RAIL SERVICE OBJECTIVES AND ECONOMIC REALITIES
[hereinafter cited as USRA I] December, 1980; UNITED STATES RAILWAY Ass'N, CONRAIL AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE FUTURE OF RAIL SERVICE IN THE NORTHEAST [hereinafter cited as USRA 11],
April, 1981; U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORTHEAST RAIL SERVICE,
March 31, 1981; and CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, OPTIONS FOR CONRAIL [hereinafter cited
as OPrIONS], April 1, 1981.
131 OPTIONS at 2-19. Conrail has continued to emphasize this point. Its 1984 Annual
Report states that "railroads are no longer an inevitable part of the American industrial
machine" because Conrail faces "competition from trucks in every market we serve."
Annual Report at 11.
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and volume to support two-railroad service.' 3' Given that the goal of
competition is economic efficiency, it was concluded that rail-rail compe-
tition should not be subsidized in markets where it is not economically
justified. 132 Rail-rail competition provided by the private sector required
comparable justification.
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed on creating an efficient railroad
and despite several billion dollars of government investment, Conrail
showed a net operating loss of $2 billion between 1976 and 1981.133 Rail
freight traffic kept falling as trucks increased their market share in the
well-highwayed Northeast. At intermittent evaluations, the government
declared the bottom had been reached, but it never was.
D. The Decision to Sell Conrail
Finally, in 1981, the prospect of not just continued federal ownership
but continued federal liability for Conrail losses inspired a serious effort
to return the railroad to the private sector. The Northeast Rail Service
Act (NRSA)134 made several reforms designed to make Conrail more
attractive. It also directed that Conrail be sold, as a whole, if possible, but
in pieces if necessary. Preservation or enhancement of intramodal
competition was not a stated concern of the legislation.
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S DECISION TO SELL CONRAIL TO
NORFOLK SOUTHERN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
A. The Bidding Process and Selection of Norfolk Southern
With the assistance of such provisions of NERSA as relief from state
and local taxes, expedited abandonment of surplus lines and federal
funding for employee reductions, Conrail's performance improved and
enabled Conrail to meet the requirements for sale as an entity.135 The
Department of Transportation began to seek a buyer. It employed the
investment banking firm of Goldman, Sachs to advise it during the
process. Goldman, Sachs approached more than one hundred potential
purchasers.136
Interest appeared to be slight. The only concrete result through 1983
was a leveraged offer of $500 million plus wage concessions by labor
organizations representing Conrail employees.1 37
131 USRA 11 at 75.
132 Id. at 76.
IM" Bus. WK., April 16, 1984, at 80.
134 45 U.S.C. §§ 761-767c, §§ 1101-1116.
"i5 See The N.Y. Times, July 4, 1983, at D-27, col. 3.
136 Bus. WK., supra note 133, at 74.
137 Cf. supra note 135.
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Norfolk Southern was aware from the beginning that Conrail was for
sale. Its constituent railroads, Norfolk and Western and Southern, had
considered possibilities in the Northeast under the 3-R Act prior to 1976.
They had correctly foreseen the continuing decline of rail business in the
Northeast; they reacted to NERSA with caution. Nevertheless, in early
1984, a full-scale study of the prospects of a Norfolk Southern-Conrail
consolidation was undertaken.
The study produced paradoxical results. Standing alone, Conrail was a
bad investment. It would not produce a satisfactory return, and, in fact,
over time the railroad would encounter cash flow problems. Yet, in
combination with Norfolk Southern, the results were different. The
combined systems could attract more traffic. At the same time, it could
reduce operation expenses by $140 million a year through consolidation
of duplicative lines and facilities. 138 Finally, under existing tax laws,
even after giving up Conrail's $1.8 billion net operating loss carryforward
and $305 million in investment tax credits, there would be some benefit
from Conrail's depreciation deductions. If Conrail did well, the tax benefit
would be less significant because Conrail's own income would offset it,
but if Conrail did poorly, the available depreciation deductions would
make the losses less catastrophic.
Meanwhile, Conrail's 1983 results suggested that the 1981 reforms and
Conrail's own drastic cutbacks were producing results. Net income was
$313 million.139 There was still no rush of bidders, but on April 10, 1984,
Alleghany Corporation publicly announced a $1 billion offer for the
government's stock. 140
The Department of Transportation, relieved to have reasonable offer,
announced that it would accept bids only through June 18, 1984.141
Norfolk Southern made an offer of $1 billion on that date. 142 Thir-
teen other companies also submitted bids, some frivolous, a few
plausible."43
DOT began what turned out to be a lengthy bid evaluation process. In
the course of the summer of 1984, with Conrail having its best-ever year,
DOT managed to get the Norfolk Southern bid increased to $1.2 bil-
lion.'" In August, DOT named 6 "finalists," reduced to 3 in September:
Norfolk Southern, Alleghany Corporation and the Marriott Group. 145 At
138 Cf. Letter from J. Paul McGrath to Elizabeth H. Dole (January 29, 1985) (reprinted in
Sale of Conrail: Hearings on S261-31.9 Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1985)) [hereinafter McGrath Letter].
139 See Bus. Wx., supra note 128, at 76.
140 Cf. TRAFFIC WORLD, May 7, 1984, at 18-19.
141 Id.
142 Roanoke Times & World News, June 19, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
143 See The New York Times, September 20, 1984, at D-4 cot. 6.
144 See id.
145 See id.
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that time DOT referred the Norfolk Southern bid to the Departments of
Justice and Treasury for antitrust and tax evaluation, and also negoti-
ated forms of contracts with the finalists. Finally, on February 5, 1985,
DOT accepted the Norfolk Southern offer, subject to enactment of
necessary legislation.1 46
B. Department of Justice Evaluation of Norfolk Southern-Conrail
Consolidation
The Department of Justice (DOJ) evaluation lacked any direct prece-
dent. In the first place, NERSA had no provision for any DOJ involve-
ment if Conrail was sold as a whole and provided only for DOJ comments
if Conrail was sold in pieces. 147 Secondly, it was clear from the beginning
that any sale to Norfolk Southern would (as all railroad sales have since
1920) take place under a statutory exemption from the antitrust laws. In
the absence of any direct precedent, it would have been logical for DOJ to
analyze the impact on competition using the balancing approach found in
ICC merger decisions.
Norfolk Southern, however, did not know and was not told what
approach DOJ would take. Throughout the fall of 1984, it furnished large
amounts of traffic data and other information at DOJ's request. Later in
1984 and early in 1985, it furnished additional information on particular
stations and commodities identified by DOJ.
DOJ analyzed the combination as if it were in fact subject to the
Clayton Act. Substantively, its study followed the pattern of recent DOJ
studies submitted in ICC merger proceedings.148 But there was an
important procedural difference. In an ICC proceeding, DOJ's role has
been to explain the anti-competitive impact of a transaction. The Com-
mission has weighed that impact against other public interest consider-
ations in reaching a decision. In the Norfolk Southern-Conrail referral,
DOJ was not only the advocate of competition, but the judge of what
should be done to preserve it.
On January 29, 1985, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust J. Paul
McGrath reported to Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole that the
Norfolk Southern-Conrail combination was acceptable, subject to dives-
titures.149 The divestitures were required to be sufficient to add a railroad
146 See The United States of America Norfolk Southern Corporation Memorandum of
Intent of February 8, 1985.
147 45 U.S.C. § 767(a).
148 Testimony of Acting Asst. Att'y Gen. Charles F. Rule, House Commerce Transporta-
tion and Tourism Subcommittee, April 30, 1985.
149 See supra note 138.
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competitor to enumerated markets, and to link those markets to the
major eastern and western interchange points, or "gateways."' 5 0
Negotiating the DOJ-required divestitures and agreeing on a sales
price proved difficult. Finally, on April 19 and June 5, 1985, Norfolk
Southern entered agreements with the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Rail-
road (P & LE) and Guilford Transportation Industries for the transfer of
approximately 1400 miles of line (including leased lines) for a consider-
ation of $18 million and $50 million, respectively. In addition, the
agreements provided over 200 miles of trackage rights to connect the
systems where no suitable line was available for sale.
In the fall of 1985, in response to criticism of the condition and
competitiveness of the line to St. Louis that Guilford was to purchase,
Norfolk Southern and Guilford modified their agreement to substitute
trackage rights over the Conrail main line. The Justice Department also
required other changes, including direct access to Detroit for Guilford.
Finally, on November 20, the Justice Department announced that the
structure of the divestiture satisfied its concerns.15 1
With these changes, the divestitures will result in the transfer of 1094
miles of line (including leased lines) and 1167 miles of trackage rights.
The price to P&LE and Guilford is $21.8 million and $35 million,
respectively.
V. A VIEWPOINT ON RAIL-RAIL COMPETITION AND THE NORFOLK
SOUTHERN-CONRAIL AFFILIATION
A. DOJ Underestimated the Pervasiveness of Intermodal
Competition in Conrail's Market
Although Norfolk Southern negotiated and signed the required dives-
titure agreements, it consistently took the position that the remedy was
excessive. To some extent it disagreed with DOJ's analysis of markets.
More fundamentally, Norfolk Southern's view rested on a sense of where
the railroad industry was going. Particularly in Conrail territory,
Norfolk Southern saw a railroad industry with less and less heavy freight
on which to rely, and so with greater and greater dependence on general
merchandise and trailer-on-flatcar, container-on-flatcar business. That
business, however, was precisely the business for which trucks could
effectively compete, particularly for the short distances in Conrail's
region of operations. In fact, Norfolk Southern itself was experiencing
150 Specifically DOJ found that Conrail/Norfolk Southern must divest to an independent
acquirer rail assets along an east-west corridor between Buffalo and Pittsburgh on the east
to Chicago and St. Louis on the west. See supra note 138. The acquirers were to have access
to serve certain shippers in eight counties in New York, Ohio, and Indiana and a direct
connection with third party railroads in Buffalo, East St. Louis, Toledo, and Chicago. Id.
"' Roanoke Times & World-News, November 22, 1985 at A8, col. 2.
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losses to trucks in some of the very markets identified by DOJ as
potentially subject to rail market power.15 2
A number of features of the DOJ study caused it to understate the truck
competition which was Norfolk Southern's dominant concern. First of
these features was the study's underlying data base, the 1977 Census of
Transportation. 153 Although DOJ tried to account for subsequent devel-
opments, 154 the computerized selection of problem markets on the basis of
traffic shares did not reflect the growing role of trucks.
Second, in an effort to be conservative, DOJ insisted on looking at
markets in terms of very highly defined commodities, specifically, five-
digit Standard Transportation Commodity Codes (STCC). 155 A large
percentage of truck volumes are not broken down that far in the records,
so even if the identical five-digit STCC is moving preponderantly by
truck, it may be recorded as, say, a three-digit commodity and never enter
the data base at the level of detail DOJ used. Furthermore, the ultimate
issue is the substitutability of truck carriage for rail carriage, and in
many instances the differences between the characteristics of commodi-
ties at the five-digit level are so small that trucks can carry one as
effectively as another.
Also, the DOJ required a very high truck share of the market, more
than 50%, to rebut the inference of rail market power.156 In reality much
smaller truck shares may show that trucks are capable of capturing more
traffic even if railroad raises rates.
For all these reasons, DOJ tended to find competitive problems with
the Norfolk Southern-Conrail combination where problems were not
likely to exist.
B. DOJ Placed Emphasis Unprecedented in Recent History on
Preserving Rail-Rail Competition in the Divestitures
The addition of another rail carrier between Buffalo and Chicago to
replace Norfolk Southern as an independent rail competitor for Conrail in
that corridor is understandable, if not ultimately in the public interest.157
Norfolk Southern and Conrail do have, more or less, parallel lines
152 Just between 1980 and 1984, the rail share of the U.S. freight bill dropped from 13%
to 11% and trucks captured more and more merchandise business. L. M. SCHNEIDER, RAILROAD
STRATEGIES FOR THE 1980'S AND 1990's (Railway Finance Law Group, October 4, 1985).
' See McGrath Letter, supra note 138, at 4 (January 29, 1985).
114 DOJ supplemented the 1977 data with survey and interviews with shippers. See id.
, See id. at 3 n.3.
156 See generally id. at 3-4.
157 Guilford has agreed to purchase Norfolk Southern/Conrail lines between these two
cities pursuant to DOJ's divestiture requirements. See id. at Attachment A.
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between those cities'5s (although Norfolk Southern has been increasingly
unable to compete with Conrail in this corridor given the significantly
greater volume of traffic on Conrail and the better service Conrail can
therefore provide). Similarly, understandable is DOJ's insistence that the
independent competitor be given the right to access industry at major rail
shipping centers currently served by both Conrail and Norfolk Southern
on or reasonably adjacent to this corridor (e.g. Cleveland, Toledo, Ft.
Wayne, steels mills in Lorain, Canton and Massillon, Ohio).159 DOJ's
concern for preserving rail-rail competition at the expense of fragmenting
traffic in the relatively shorthaul, truck-dominated Buffalo-Chicago
corridor is less compelling than the Commission's concern for preserving
rail-rail competition in the long haul transcontinental corridor in the
UP-MP consolidation, 16° but it is at least understandable.
What is more difficult to understand is DOJ's decision to require
independent rail competitors be given access to Pittsburgh, St. Louis and
a myriad of minor rail markets in between.161 Norfolk Southern is a
minor player in the rapidly declining Pittsburgh rail market, running
four trains per day at most, into or through the area, and the future of its
line into Pittsburgh, without regard to Conrail, is not bright, given the
level of business and the cost of maintaining the line. And Norfolk
Southern's lack of access to industries in the Northeast has hurt its
position for much of the business moving over the St. Louis gateway.
The divestitures have now gone so far as to provide the independent
rail competitors (i.e. Guilford and P&LE) access to relatively small
shipping points located off the St. Louis corridor, such as Wabash,
Hartford City, and Kokomo, Indiana, to establish rail-rail competition
between the independents and Norfolk Southern-Conrail beyond that
which now exists by opening all Norfolk Southern-Conrail Indianapolis
area industries to Guilford on a competitive basis (and granting Guilford
the right to take over switching of all such industries from Conrail), and
to actually increase, not simply maintain, the number of competing rail
carriers in Toledo and Ft. Wayne. Guilford is even granted the right to
perform the switching on major portions of Conrail's St. Louis line, not
only for its own account but also for Conrail's, all in the interest of
preserving rail-rail competition.
1"' The Official Railway Guide (Nov/Dec 1985). As a matter of historical interest, the
Norfolk Southern Buffalo-Chicago line was built in 1880-82 principally in order to turn a
quick profit by selling it to the then owner of Conrail's Buffalo-Chicago line, the Lake Shore
& Michigan Southern. E. F. P. STRIPLIN, supra note 90, at 275. Under pressure from DOJ,
Lake Shore's successor, New York Central, spun off the Norfolk Southern line to indepen-
dent owners in 1916. Id. at 278.
159 See McGrath Letter, supra note 138, at Attachment A.
160 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
161 See id.
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C. DOJ's Attention to Rail-Rail Competition Goes Far Beyond
What Is Required Under Transportation Law
or the National Transportation Policy
DOJ has had the opportunity in the Norfolk Southern-Conrail trans-
action to impose its view on the role rail-rail competition should play in
a rail affiliation. It is important, however, that it be understood that
DOJ's position is at odds with the views of Congress, the courts, and the
Commission as evidenced by their actions in establishing or interpreting
the Interstate Commerce Act and national transportation policy over the
last 65 years. And, DOJ has repeatedly attempted to persuade the courts
and the Commission to adopt its views but has failed.162 DOJ's views also
find no support in the legislation creating, and determining to sell,
Conrail. 163 Preservation of rail service in the Northeast has been the aim,
and excessive rail-rail competition has been viewed as detracting from
that goal.
DOJ is frank in admitting that the proposed acquisition of Conrail "was
analyzed... according to the same standards and principles... [applied]
to mergers generally."164 What DOJ ignores, and has always ignored in
rail consolidations, is that, rightly or wrongly, there is a national
transportation policy which encourages consolidation of rail carriers in
order to preserve, with minimal disruption and human cost, a national
rail transportation system.
It is possible the shipping public would have been better off today if
Congress had decided to use Section 7 of the Clayton Act as the standard
for rail consolidations.1 65 Perhaps if the Seaboard Air Line and Atlantic
Coast Line, or Great Northern and Northern Pacific, had not been
permitted to merge in the 1960's and 1970's, the pressures of truck
competition and the inability to consolidate facilities and personnel
would have forced those roads to take the drastic steps Florida East Coast
Railway has taken to survive [i.e., take a long term strike (with its
disruption and human costs) and eventually become a non-union, low cost
carrier.] 16 Perhaps, however, such efforts by one or all of these roads, and
162 See supra text accompanying notes 47, 57, 67 & 72.
163 See supra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
64 See McGrath Letter, supra note 138, at 3.
165 Indeed, DOJ believes the Clayton Act standard and Interstate Commerce Act
standards are "substantially the same." Id. at 2 n.2.
"'b The Florida East Coast Railway had been a marginal carrier for years while
operating under the burdens of the national collective bargaining agreements. In 1963 it
accepted a strike rather than acquiesce in the national agreement, (see Brotherhood of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 239 (1966)), and eventually prevailed. In
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others, would have failed and they would have by now entered the
bankruptcy courts. And even that result might not, in DOJ's view, be
unacceptable: the freedom to compete is the freedom to fail and if a large
part of the rail industry has become redundant, so be it. The answer to
DOJ, at least for now, however, is that Congress continues to believe that
maintaining a healthy rail industry by means of consolidation, for the
various reasons discussed previously, is in the national interest.
Be that as it may, DOJ's views have carried the day, Norfolk Southern
has committed to the unprecedented divestitures establishing two new
competitors to Norfolk Southern-Conrail, and the matter is before Con-
gress. What Norfolk Southern has the right to ask at this stage is for
acknowledgement by responsible participants in the Conrail sale process
that the rail-rail competition issue has, by virtue of the divestitures, been
at least adequately addressed and is now a non-issue. Informed opponents
of the Norfolk Southern acquisition who raise the spectre of monopolies
and antitrust are, at this stage, merely attempting to buttress a position
they have chosen to take for other reasons.
Author's Note
On February 4, 1986, the U.S. Senate approved by a vote of 54-39,
legislation sponsored by DOT providing for Conrail to be sold to Norfolk
Southern. The legislation provided that DOT was authorized to proceed
with the sale in conjunction with the divestitures required by DOJ. In the
face of the announced opposition to the sale by the Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, and at the request of DOT, on May 9,
1986, Norfolk Southern increased its cash offer to the government for
Conrail to $1.9 billion (and, for the first time, agreed to Interstate
Commerce Commission review, on an expedited basis between enactment
of the sale legislation and consummation of the sale, or any competitive
issues raised by the sale). Nonetheless, the legislation did not advance in
the House and, ultimately, on August 21, 1986, Norfolk Southern
withdrew its offer to purchase Conrail. The preceding article was written
prior to these developments. The consideration given to the issues
analyzed in this article will remain relevant as alternative dispositions of
Conrail are contemplated by the government.
recent years Florida East Coast has been consistently profitable in a geographically limited
market with strong truck competition.
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